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Good books and research articles explicitly state and focus on simple yet
counterintuitive theoretical questions.  Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s recent book, How
the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, has this admirable quali-
ty. “Why do the strong lose to the weak?” is the opening sentence and motivat-
ing question. Briefly stated, Toft’s answer is that the weak prevail when they
adopt a military strategy that exploits the weaknesses in the strong state’s strate-
gy.  In defending this thesis, Toft not only enhances our understanding of out-
comes in asymmetric conflicts but also makes a positive contribution to a grow-
ing program on military strategy. Anyone interested in either of these topics will
profit from reading this book. 
As a product of the Chicago School of International Relations, Toft follows
in the footsteps of John Mearsheimer, Robert Pape, and Michael Desch and
focuses on military strategy. Contrary to those who suggest that the weak defeat
the strong for reasons related to regime type, arms diffusion, or greater motiva-
tion, Toft contends that a strategy mismatch is the key to understanding these
otherwise surprising outcomes. To evaluate this hypothesis, Toft examines all
militarily asymmetric wars in the Correlates of War database (1800-2003). He
codes the strategy employed by each side, creates a variable for whether or not
the strategies matched, and analyzes the relationship between the strategic inter-
action variable and the war outcome. In addition, he examines the logic of the
argument in five case studies: the Murid War in the Caucasus, the Boer War, the
Italo-Ethiopian War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-Afghan War.
While fully aware of the spectrum of military strategies, Toft groups the
strategies for each actor into two general types. Strong actors employ either a
conventional attack or barbarism approach, with barbarism including counter-
insurgency, and weak actors can employ either a conventional defense or a guer-
rilla warfare strategy. It is worth noting that Toft allows actors to switch strate-
gies throughout a war. For example, a strong state may start with a conventional
attack but switch to a barbarism strategy during the war. After recording the strat-
egy for each actor for each major phase of a war, Toft creates a variable for
whether the strategies matched. Conventional attack matches conventional
defense, and barbarism matches guerrilla warfare.  This leads to the central
hypothesis of the book: “when actors employ similar strategic approaches
(direct-direct or indirect-indirect) relative power explains the outcome: strong
actors will win quickly and decisively. When actors employ opposite strategic
approaches (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), weak actors are much more likely
to win . . .” (p. 18) Consistent with this expectation, he finds that strong actors
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win approximately 77 percent of same approach match-ups, but only 37 percent
of opposite approach match-ups.  
Toft also makes an effort to rule out some of the most likely alternative
explanations. In light of research highlighting the importance of domestic polit-
ical institutions, Toft examines whether regime type makes a difference. The
regime hypothesis presented by Toft is that authoritarian regimes are more effec-
tive militarily, so they should be less likely to lose to weak actors. Toft also
examines a complementary regime hypothesis: that democratic states are unwill-
ing to bear the necessary burdens to triumph. Arms diffusion is a second alterna-
tive explanation raised by Toft. The arms diffusion argument is that weak actors
may have access to modern weapons, thereby leveling the playing field. Toft
evaluates this by examining whether a weak actor received outside assistance.
The third alternative argument discussed is interest asymmetry. The argument
here is that stronger actors have less interest in the fight and therefore are more
likely to lose. 
Of these three alternative explanations, the regime hypothesis is the most
theoretically cogent, yet it is not fully examined.  To evaluate the effect of regime
type one would have to examine the regime composition of the warring dyad.
This is not done.  The arms diffusion hypothesis is difficult to examine system-
atically as one not only needs to determine if there was direct outside assistance
but also the quantity and quality of arms weak actors were able to obtain on their
own. In Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of
Imperialism (2007), the historian Jonathan A. Grant documents how arms indus-
tries in Britain, France, Germany, and Austria exported their wares around the
world, even to countries with whom their governments were not friendly.  Even
without active support from another state, it is likely that weak actors have ben-
efited from arms diffusion. 
Toft’s argument leaves some important questions unanswered. To what
extent are strategies endogenous?  It is highly unlikely that actors choose mili-
tary strategies randomly. This choice is likely a function of geographical features,
the nature of technology, regime type, and the nature of the leader. Given that one
can assess the influence of these factors ahead of time with some degree of con-
fidence, we cannot easily dismiss some of the alternative arguments raised by
Toft. For example, perhaps democratic states are less likely to employ barbarism
strategies than non-democratic states.   
While less central to the validity of the matched-strategy thesis, the story
would be stronger if two other questions were addressed. First, conventional wis-
dom suggests that the weak win when they employ a guerrilla warfare strategy.
Toft contends that guerrilla warfare is only likely to lead to success if the strong
state does not employ a barbarism strategy.  Since he only reports aggregate
information on the strategic interaction variable, however, we cannot determine
how often a weak state’s guerrilla warfare strategy has failed. Similarly, conven-
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tional wisdom, and work by Robert Pape on air power, suggests that barbarism
will almost always fail. It would be interesting to know if Toft’s data supports
this expectation.  Second, it would be telling to know why some but not all weak
states change to a winning strategy.  One might conjecture that strong states have
less freedom to shift strategies owing to institutional inertia and size. These fac-
tors should be less relevant in weak actors, yet not all of them adopt strategies
that maximize their chances of winning. 
Notwithstanding the importance of these questions, they also speak to the
clarity and quality of Toft’s writing. These questions come to mind because the
writing is exceptionally clear and the thesis is interesting. The bottom line is that
Toft’s book is worth reading. It makes an important contribution to our under-
standing of asymmetric conflict and contributes to a growing literature on the
importance of military strategy.  
Mark Souva is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida State
University.
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In Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, Jeremy Weinstein
provides a detailed empirical investigation into the “micropolitics of rebellion”
(p. 38), explicating the link between rebel behavior and rebel leaders’ manage-
ment of both external resources and internal pressures.  Although many studies
of rebel violence in civil wars focus on the role of opposing state forces in
explaining variation in group behaviors, Weinstein argues instead that the use of
rebel violence can be explained, in part, by the internal dynamics of such organ-
izations.  A key theme underpinning the analyses presented in this book is that
insurgent groups are little different from other political organizations and, as
such are constrained in their operations from within and without. (p. 51)  
The main finding of this book is that rebel organizations that emerge in
resource-rich environments tend to commit higher levels of indiscriminate vio-
lence, while initially resource-poor organizations are more likely to be selective
in their employ of violent behavior against civilians. (p. 7) For Weinstein, the
group’s initial resource endowment constitutes a significant external constraint
on rebel behavior through shaping its membership profile.  Internally, the man-
agement of the organization’s membership is a critical concern.  Weinstein clas-
sifies rebel organizations into two groups whose constitutions are based upon
incentives for individual participation. (pp. 9-11, 204-08)  He argues that
“activist rebellions” emerge largely in resource-poor environments and so attract
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